Abstract: The present article turns the spotlight onto epistemic-normative dilemmas that, in my estimation, stand at the heart of the humanities as a field of study (the reason for the hyphen between epistemic and normative will become evident as we progress). For the sake of elucidating these productive tensions, we will delve into the thought of Richard Koebner (1885-1958) -a Jewish historian that emigrated from Germany to Palestine in 1934. This transition crystallized the above-mentioned dilemmas in his own mind, from both a personal and theoretical standpoint. More specifically, he developed a critical historiographic outlook on the past and present alike. A major focus of his deliberations was the nature of humanistic knowledge, not least historiography. Though this question preoccupied Koebner throughout his academic career, the new circumstances in Palestine/Israel sharpened and shaped his perspective.
The wound of the humanities
In recent years, the humanities have been at the center of both public and scholarly debates. Many observers have questioned the utility of humanistic knowledge, while others abidingly champion the idea that practicalities are irrelevant criteria for this field. Even among its supporters, though, opinions differ. For some, knowledge of this sort undergirds the professional training of teachers and scholars. For others, the humanities constitute the foundation stone of liberal education, as the discipline molds individuals, or "concerned citizens" through the lengthy process of Bildung. Yet another stated goal is the fostering of critical thought. Dismissing these universal objectives, nationalists utilize the humanities to bolster the standing of their collective's traditions among their "compatriots." 1 For the most part, these important debates concentrate on the ideological, political, and ethical dimensions of the humanities, but there is a parallel, and no less significant, discussion concerning the field's epistemic status. More specifically, this framework revolves around the distinctiveness of man and society as objects of the investigation. The non-necessity, contingency and indeterminacy of such objects -take the example of the "nation" -substantiate the view that knowledge of mankind is less than scientific. In essence, this sort of knowledge is reflexive or self-reflexive. As a result, the boundaries between academia and society are constantly being re-negotiated. Discerning meaning, not just facts, via interpretation and analysis is also part and parcel of reflexiveness. This, in turn, calls for the use of rhetorical tropes for articulating research findings, which seems to further constrain their epistemic status and boundaries. 2 The overlap between these two lines of debate testifies to the dual nature of the humanities: they are both epistemic and normative. In my estimation, this multifaceted nature produces two focal points of tension that are inherent to this enterprise. The first pertains to the argument that there is universal knowledge of contingent, context-bounded, language-dependent objects. This claim has come under scrutiny at different phases in the history and prehistory of the Western humanities. For instance, scholastic philosophers' critique of fifteenth-century humanists that was radicalized by nineteenth century scientific discourse. 3 The second innate tension concerns the normative dimension of the humanities and is related to the amount of freedom necessary for researching, articulating, and teaching knowledge about human beings and societies. Humanists have always been torn between the inclination of the powers that be to appropriate this knowledge and their own need to distance themselves from the leadership's demands. A case in point is the fifteenth-century humanists at the court of Pope Nicolas V; or eighteenthcentury philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant at the University of Königsberg. This freedom has always been tenuous, as it rests on the humanists' ability to institutionalize their disciplines and build an autonomous habitus. These kind of dilemmas also serve as the backdrop for Richard Koebner's work, both in Germany and Jerusalem. A native of Breslau, he was educated at universities in Breslau, Berlin, and Geneva. Upon completing his studies, Koebner taught medieval and modern history at Breslau for twenty-five years, before being relieved of his duties in adherence to the Nazis' racial laws. In 1934, he was appointed the founding chair of The Hebrew University's Department of General History and the institution's first professor in this field.
Back in Germany, Koebner had already mused over the epistemic status of the historical disciplines, as well as the ethical commitment and significance of practicing historians. 4 This, then, leads us to the question of how Koebner defined facts. What are their essential features? And how are facts winnowed from the materials that historians ply? Koebner's 1953 theoretical paper ascribes a major role to semantics in the recording of history. Likewise, the hermeneutic and methodological difficulties of establishing facts in the humanities is a major topic of his empirical work. 7 In addition, a recurring theme in his writing concerns the interdependence between political realities and the words, terms, and concepts that were in vogue during any historic era. According to Koebner, a word markedly shapes political developments when its use befits specific historical conditions. Facts cannot be separated from the concepts that both represent and produce them. Concepts always "dwell in" the facts, so to speak. Historians seeking to reconstruct erstwhile relations between concepts and facts gradually discern historical realities by contemplating the words that inform their sources. Furthermore, the argument can be made that the historian's work revolves around tracking concepts that were altered by historical players. This thesis is encapsulated in the preamble to Koebner's study on the term despotism, which touches on the connection between "vocabulary and the fate of states." Likewise, he basically concludes the paper on the following note: "It is no exaggeration to say that the concept of despotisme played a part in the intellectual and political unrest which drove the French monarchy down to the Revolution." 8 Koebner's deep interest in the connection between words and human actions -representations and underlying realities -precluded a naïve reading of sources. He believed that historians must develop critical tools to guard against the temptation of understanding sources as mirrors of actual events. In some respects, though, this assumption casts doubt on the scientific capacity of the historian to represent the past "as it truly was" (wie es eigentlich gewesen), for if this were true how could words constitute events and vice versa? Moreover, this goal implies that historians' words are also their object. For this very reason, Koebner seriously weighed the possibilities and limitations of historical objectification.
In an unpublished manuscript, Vom Begriff des historischen Ganzen, Koebner challenged the notion that history is a scientific discipline or, perhaps, re-categorized the discipline. Completed in 1933, 9 this work endeavors to identify the object of historical research. In the process, it shifts the spotlight from the methodology and epistemology of historiographic discourse onto the ontology of history. Though Koebner was engaged in contemporaneous philosophical debates about historicism, hermeneutics, the cultural sciences, and the social sciences, he refused to classify this issue as merely a problem of the philosophy of history. Clues as to Koebner's outlook on this matter can be discerned from his participation in sundry debates and his own historiographical praxis. Within these frameworks, he discussed how words and concepts constitute historical events. In turn, the events create the words that enable the former to be represented and analyzed. What is more, Koebner came to the realization that concepts are the product of the historians' gaze. He claimed that the vantage point of this sort of observation is invariably the scholars' own era; however, it is also influenced by their historical consciousness of the past. Koebner referred to this broad outlook as "the historical whole" (das historisches Ganze). By dint of this theoretical concept, he hoped to stabilize the historical discourse, to strike a balance between subjectivity and objectivity and between particular events and general categories, such as despotism, imperialism, or "Western culture," which enable individual objects to be aggregated into meaningful constellations.
At this juncture, it is worth citing a passage from this difficult text: An object's historicity, Koebner posited, can only be found in the movement from present to past and from the generality of the historical whole to individual facts concerning events, people, or social movements. As is evident from his thoughts on nationalism, Koebner was well aware of the dangers latent in this perspective. More specifically, he admitted that a multi-national community is incapable of serving as the point of departure for any historical view that emerges from a national context. Every national movement sees its own nation as the acme of historical development. In consequence, Koebner was alert to and discouraged by the pitfalls of subjectivism. For instance, he contended that although historians are capable of imagining a historical whole, this perception is not entirely synonymous with true knowledge. In all likelihood, this pessimism is what kept the manuscript from being published during his lifetime.
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Sometime between 1933 and 1934, Koebner submitted Vom Begriff to the historian Johan Huizinga for publication with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences. In a letter from March 1934, 12 Huizinga informed him that the academy was unable to publish the manuscript owing to financial difficulties. Moreover, the Dutch historian candidly voiced his profound disagreement with Koebner's views. To begin with, Huizinga rejected the concept of a "historical whole" on the grounds that it obfuscated both the subjective and objective aspects of historical knowledge. He also wrote that a conscious distancing from the present was conducive to reflection on the past: "Zugleich aber glaube ich an eine ganz selbstlose, nicht auf eine aktuelle Gegenwart bezogene Vertiefung in die Geschichte." 13 While Huizinga concurred that from the viewpoint of the present, nationalism was the inevitable starting point of the historical record, he This letter indeed exposes the abyss dividing the two correspondents. Huizinga held fast to idealist yet utterly quixotic norms that proved to be futile in all that pertains to coping with the political realities of the day. Though burdened by despair, Koebner grappled with the problem of truth in the historical discourse. His 1934 essay Zur Begriffsbildung der Kulturgeschichte 16 can be read as a subtle response to Huizinga's frank yet lumbering critique. According to Koebner, Huizinga's method was the outgrowth of his particular reflection on the "spirit" of the Dutch nation in which vigorous, fully-formed abstract concepts take a back seat to intuitive thinking by way of concrete illustrations. Moreover, he contended that the Dutch scholar had transformed his national mindset into a historical method, which the former dubbed "Denken in Anschauungen" ("thinking through illustrations"). In other words, Huizinga attempted to "grasp truth" or "gain knowledge," as well as convey these findings to readers, by decoding appearances: "Seine Idee der Kulturgeschichte entfaltet sich recht eigentlich als ein wissenschaftliches Denken in Anschauungen."
17 It bears noting that Koebner had no intention of simply dismissing Huizinga's entire approach and refrained from claiming that it was conceptually lacking. "Huizingas Denken in Anschauungen ist nicht begriffslos und noch weniger begriffsblind." 18 That said, Koebner questioned whether his colleague's approach was the only way to surmount the methodological barriers to historical knowledge. In the final analysis, he averred that Huizinga's thought process was better suited for journalism than historiography:
In seiner Bereitwilligkeit, das Thema zu wechseln, in seiner Vorliebe für die kleine Form der Betrachtung, die öfters nicht Erkenntnisse, sondern nur Eindrücke gestaltet, und schließlich auch darin, dass er seine Eindrucksfähigkeit ebenso aufmerksam für die Gegenwart wie für die Vergangenheit offen hält, bekundet sich, dass Huizinga die Nachbarschaft mit einem Journalismus sehr vornehmen Stils eher aufsucht als scheut.
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Be that as it may, this exchange harbors more than stylistic and methodological differences. Beneath the surface lies the question of what is a worthy object of historical research. For his part, Huizinga raised the banner of historical research concentrating on a minor nation. Moreover, he generally eschewed politics and current events in his historical work. This position dovetailed neatly with his commitment to the absolute values of truth and justice, even in the face of the Nazi threat to the existing moral and political order. As for Koebner, it is clear from his musings on "the historical whole" that he was fully engaging the paramount issue of the day: the politics of nation-states, in the broadest sense of the word. This course of action also betrays the paradoxes of his Jewish-German existence. All the more so, it exposes the predicament of a historian that was preoccupied with his field's thorniest epistemic and ontological quandaries and who knew no other way to tackle these problems other than from the vantage point of the "great" German nation. While clearly identifying with that people to some degree, his essay also undercut this affiliation with its pessimistic tone and wavering conclusions.
Historical consciousness: Between public and scholarly historiography
These paradoxes did not end with Koebner's immigration to Palestine and appointment to the faculty of The Hebrew University. In Jerusalem, he straddled the fence between two worlds: on the one hand, he identified with his fellow members of the mass exodus that was underway and did not necessarily see the divisions among the Jewish people as a weakness; on the other hand, and notwithstanding his opposition to its leadership, he was committed to the yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine). This incongruous, tension-ridden existence became Koebner's daily norm. He never really acclimated himself to the yishuv's social life, even the small professorate in Jerusalem. That said, he did fully identify with the Brit Shalom movement. Primarily led mostly by scholars from the German-speaking world, such as Ernst Simon, Julius Gutmann, and Hugo Bergmann, this group objected to the violent nature of the efforts to establish a Jewish state and clamored for a bi-national, Jewish-Palestinian entity. However, this realistic option garnered little support from within the yishuv.
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The metamorphosis of Koebner's German essay on the "historical whole" into a condensed Hebrew article titled "On the Object of Scientific Historiography" 21 reveals that his prior equivocations had been transformed into a lucid, steadfast, and critical message. In the first place, he drew a distinction between "scientific history" and "cultural history." Moreover, the paper argued that history merited a special standing in the public life of a nation. With this in mind, Koebner endeavored to bridge the gap between the content and the epistemology of history as science, on the one hand, and the role of historians (to exclude historians of culture) in the political realm, on the other. It is worth noting that he relegated historians to secondary roles in this sphere, outside of politics proper. For example, they could serve as informal advisers, but not as diplomats. At any rate, he posited that history is the science of "past facts," which are ascertained by means of "continuous and methodical observation" from the vantage point of the present. Koebner was quite cognizant of the tensions that he was striving to overcome: "In the affinity of history and current public life, some essential facets of history that do not comply with the nature of science are glaring." 22 Thereafter, the article examines certain aspects of subjectivism, interest in the particular, and history's embeddedness in transient actualities. While admitting that the task was arduous, he outlined the conditions that were required for conducting universal contemporary history. A globalist avant la lettre, Koebner was trying to anchor the historians' consciousness to international public opinion and modern liberal political principles, which at first glance appear to be of the universal variety. Koebner also laid down guidelines for historians researching their own national histories:
This lesson, which Koebner took away from his exchange with Huizinga, served him well in Palestine/Israel. Koebner did not limit his insights to the theoretical realm. When necessary, he assumed the garb of a "prophet," excoriating actions that he plainly deemed to be immoral. A case in point is Koebner' 24 Koebner's self-perception as a migrant among his own people undoubtedly strengthened his critical voice. To avoid the pitfalls of political immorality, he advised his readers to "study some more history." This pithy call seems to capture the essence of his approach to teaching and conducting "scientific history," which he viewed as the cornerstone of the humanities. Koebner was convinced that history is not merely a discourse of experts that is cut off from society's needs, but rather a major tool for improving public life via teaching and scholarship. The ultimate justification for this position can be found in a lecture, Historical Consciousness as Object of the Science of History: Examination of Conscience, which he delivered on the occasion of his retirement from The Hebrew University. 25 Koebner's conviction was apparently grounded on the premise that all societies are inclined to reflect on and burnish their selfimage through the prism of the group's shared history. These activities comprise what he referred to as "public historical consciousness." Be that as it may, the raison d'être of professional historians is to scrutinize the public image on the basis of a research orientation that is undergirded by a quest for truth. The public indeed takes part in the historical discourse, but its role differs from that of scholars. Whereas the latter are committed to speaking their mind for the good of society, the public is likely to be offended by criticism. Against this backdrop, the following question begs asking: is this edifying ethos commensurate with the historian's overriding duty to research and teach the past? Surprising as it might be, Koebner answered that the two functions are not entirely compatible. In many respects, this moral demand on historians is paradoxical, for it encroaches on the border separating fact from ideology. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon historians to remain faithful to their vocation and to acquaint themselves with their dialogical partners -the public -for the sake of fulfilling their utmost duty: buttressing society's historical consciousness with the discipline's critical tools and accurate knowledge of the past. In our interactions with society, historians will always feel the crosscurrents of the particular and the universal, the practical and the theoretical, knowledge and value, power and knowledge. As Koebner evidently gleaned from his years of practice in Geisteswissenschaften and then its Hebrew analogue, madaei haruaḥ, it is these competing forces that have maintained the vitality of the humanities over the generations. His admonition to "study some more history" is perhaps of greater relevance today than ever before, provided that it is driven by a hunger for truth, rather than the goal of spreading propaganda.
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